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Abstract
We model the way the interplay between tax surveillance institutions and civic capital shapes
taxpayers’ support for welfare state. We show that, when tax surveillance is tight, rational civic-
minded individuals express greater support for welfare spending than uncivic ones. We provide
empirical evidence of these preferences using data from Italy, a country that has long posed a
puzzle for public economists for its limited civic capital and large welfare state.
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1 Introduction
In these times of economic crisis and public finance distress, the issue of welfare state
legitimacy has become a central theme in the political and economic debate. Low
economic growth, rising unemployment rates and economic insecurity have produced
contradictory pressures on European welfare states. On the one hand, the financial
viability of public social protection schemes has been increasingly questioned. On the
other hand, the demand for social protection has dramatically risen. In Southern Eu-
rope, conflicting views on social solidarity and public finance adjustment have gained
∗We are grateful to Joshua Angrist for his helpful suggestions in an early stage of the work.
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growing attention in electoral campaigns, in some cases triggering tensions between
local governments and EU institutions 1.
The sustainability and legitimacy of the welfare state ultimately depend on citizens’
support, which, according to standard economic reasoning, might be basically deter-
mined by self-interest. Algan et al. (2016) showed that dishonest citizens express
higher support for the welfare state because they expect to benefit from it without
bearing its costs. Algan et al.’s model helps understand how countries with tradi-
tionally low levels of trust and civic capital, such as the Southern European ones, can
have large welfare states.
Modelling the interplay between civic capital and surveillance institutions, we show
that taxpayers’ preference for welfare spending varies according to their civic-mindedness
in ways less obvious than expected. Specifically, when tax surveillance is perceived as
tight, civic-minded taxpayers rationally express higher support for the welfare state
than uncivic citizens 2. Our model extends the framework proposed by Algan et al.
(2016) by making the plausible assumption that, when taxpayers consider whether to
support higher government spending or not, they also take into account the efficiency
and tightness of tax surveillance, i.e. the probability of being caught in case of tax
evasion and the entity of the punishment possibly inflicted by enforcement institu-
tions. As the tightness of surveillance increases, civic-minded individuals will be more
confident that everyone will pay taxes and that free riding and rent seeking activities
will be limited, resulting in higher support for welfare spending. On the other hand,
uncivic individuals will find a large-sized welfare state less attractive. Higher levels
of civic capital at the macro level strengthen the support for large welfare states in
either type of individual.
We use the notion of civic capital in the sense proposed by Guiso et al. (2011; 2016) as
those persistent and shared beliefs that help a group overcome the free rider problem
in the pursuit of socially valuable outcomes. This form of capital has both a micro
and a macro dimension. At the micro level, it takes the form of those norms that,
among other things, lead the individual to behave prosocially, thereby discouraging
free riding and rent seeking behaviours. At the macro level, civic capital derives from
1A thorough discussion of this conflict is presented in Ferrera (2016).
2Hereafter, we will use civic and civic-minded as synonyms for sake of readability.
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the sharing of the same norms. 3
We then test the predictions of the model using cross-sectional micro data provided
by the Bank of Italy in its Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). To op-
erationalize the concept of civic capital in the empirical analysis we follow Guiso et
al. (2011; 2016) and use indicators of the extent to which individuals dislike actions
of free riding and rent seeking. To account for the possible endogeneity of individuals’
civic-mindedness we use a procedure proposed by Wooldridge (2002). This approach
allows one to overcome the absence of traditional identifying information, such as
external instruments, through the construction of instruments from a nonlinear first-
stage.
The main conclusions of the empirical analysis are derived from the coefficient of the
interacted term between taxpayers’ civic capital and their perception of the prob-
ability of being caught and sanctioned in case of tax evasion, which we use as a
proxy for the efficiency of surveillance institutions. The empirical analysis shows that
civic-minded individuals are significantly less likely to support the welfare state. In-
teracting our indicator of civic capital with the perceived efficacy of tax surveillance,
however, reveals that when surveillance is regarded as efficient, civic-minded indi-
viduals manifest a significantly stronger support for the welfare state in respect to
uncivic ones.
These theoretical and empirical findings have important policy implications, suggest-
ing that tightnening tax surveillance could induce a more truthful revelation of the
preferences of civic-minded citizens causing a shift in taxpayers’ preference for re-
distribution, with effects on tax morale, the outcomes of electoral competitions and,
ultimately, public spending.
Our study bridges three strands of literature. The first deals generically with the
economic outcomes of social capital dimensions. This body of studies empirically
analyses how trust, civicness, and networks influence prosocial behavior (Sapienza et
3 There may be doubt whether social capital – and civic capital, in particular – is an individual or a collective
construct. In the sociological literature, it is commonly agreed that it is both. According to Bourdieu (1986) and
Coleman (1988), social capital is basically an individual resource. The sharing of this resource, on the other hand,
allows formal or informal groups of individuals to pursue shared goals. Bourdieu (1980) argues that actors might use
social relations – which are often developed on the basis of a common belief – as means to increase their ability to
advance personal interests and improve well-being. Coleman (1988) considers social capital as a resource that, while
inherent in the structure of relations between actors, basically serves to ”facilitate certain actions of actors, whether
persons or corporate actors, within the structure”” (p. 98). Reviews of these aspects social capital can be found in
Coleman, 1990; Woolcock, 1998; Fine, 2001.
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al., 2013), tax morale (Andriani, 2015), regulation (Aghion et al., 2010), financial
development (Guiso et al., 2004), trade (Guiso et al., 2009), and economic growth
(Algan et al., 2010; Algan and Cahuc, 2014; Bigoni et al., 2016) just to name a few.
The second strand investigates the roots of citizens’ preference for redistribution
in relation to self- and other-regarding motivations, such as the taxpayers’ future
income and mobility prospects, the perceived equality of opportunities, and feelings
of social rivalry (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Piketty, 1995; Benabou and Ok,
2001; Fong, 2011; Corneo and Gruner, 2002), as well as possible feelings of empathy
prompted by repeated social interactions (Yamamura, 2012; Sabatini et al., 2014).
The third strand of the literature studies the determinants of the size of the welfare
state. Overall, this body of research suggests that trust could reinforce the welfare
state because trusting taxpayers may be less concerned with the free riding problem
intrinsically connected with universal and simple access to public goods and services
(Rothstein, 2002; Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011; Bjørnskov and Svendsen, 2013; Daniele
and Geys, 2015). Algan et al. (2016) remarkably innovated this literature revealing
the twin peaks relationship between the country’s level of trust and the size of the
welfare state and explaining it as a consequence of dishonest citizens’ stronger pref-
erence for redistribution.
We add to these fields of studies in substantive ways. We provide an empirically
testable prediction of how surveillance institutions interact with civic capital in de-
termining taxpayers’ support for the welfare state. In testing the predictions of the
model, we differentiate ourselves from previous literature by using a rich dataset from
Italy - a country that has long posed a puzzle for public economists for its limited
civic capital and large welfare state - and a new identification method to tackle some
measurement and endogeneity problems. More specifically, we exploit detailed infor-
mation on taxpayers’ opinions about the hypothetical role and the preferred extension
of welfare state schemes (such as, for example, those related to healthcare and pen-
sions) and about their perception of the efficiency of tax enforcement institutions,
which was not accounted for in previous empirical studies. In addition, we propose
an empirical strategy to tackle the endogeneity of civic capital and of its interaction
with tax surveillance.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model and
illustrates its predictions. Section 3 is devoted to the description of our data and
empirical strategy. Section 4 tests the predictions of the model at the individual level
and provides an interpretation of results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
We start the theoretical analysis by modeling how the interplay between civic capital
and surveillance institutions shapes support for the welfare state. This part of the
analysis extends the model developed by Algan et al. (2016).
We consider a continuum of individuals of measure one, and partition them according
to their civic-mindedness. Assume that α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of civic individuals,
and the remaining 1−α the percentage of uncivic ones. As in Algan et al. (2016), all
individuals share the same preferences over consumption, c, and the utility function
is logarithmic, i.e.: u(c) = log(c).
Each individual produces a certain amount y > 0 of consumption goods with proba-
bility pi, and a lower level y0 < y with probability 1− pi.
Those who produce amounts y0 of consumption goods are entitled to welfare ben-
efits. Agents producing y must pay a tax, t, to finance such benefits b. However,
productive taxpayers can cheat both on taxes and on welfare benefits, by declaring a
lower amount of production and then claiming welfare benefits they are not actually
entitled to. Following Algan et al. (2016) we call these individuals ”uncivic”. Civic
individuals, on the other hand, neither cheat on taxes nor claim benefits they are
not entitled to: they always declare their true level of production and – when their
production is y – they pay the tax t. At this point, we extend the framework of Algan
et al. (2016) by making the plausible assumption that enforcement institutions not
only monitor taxpayers’ level of production but also have the power to inflict penalties
ontax evaders.
Tax surveillance specifically concerns those who declare lower amounts of production,
y0 < y, and claim welfare benefits. When an inspection reveals that their true level of
production is y, the surveillance institution imposes a fine M , requires the payment
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of the tax t, and withdraws the welfare benefits. The existence of surveillance institu-
tions is a deterrent to free riding and rent seeking behaviours. An uncivic individual
declares y0 (i.e. the lower level of production) and claims benefits she is not entitled
to with a positive probability 1 − p. The probability of an inspection is 1 − q, and
the inspection entails a final payoff for the uncivic individuals of y− t−M , while the
uncivic individual who is not subject to inspection obtains y + b.
We first analyse the optimal support for the welfare state from civic and uncivic in-
dividuals.
Following Algan et al (2016), we write the budget constraint of the government as
follows:
pit[α + p(1− α)] = [(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)]b. (1)
The explicit form of the expected utility U differs among civic and uncivic individuals.
Taxpayers rationally choose the tax and the benefits that maximize their utility:
U = U(t, b). Specifically, we have:
U(t, b) =


Ucivic(t, b), for civic individuals;
Uuncivic(t, b), for uncivic individuals,
(2)
where
Ucivic(t, b) = pi log(y − t) + (1− pi) log(y0 + b) (3)
and
Uuncivic(t, b) = pi[p log(y−t)+(1−p)q log(y+b)+(1−p)(1−q) log(y−t−M)]+(1−pi) log(y0+b).
(4)
It is important to note that the deterrent provided by enforcement institutions only
affects the utility of uncivic individuals, as civic-minded ones will refrain to cheat on
taxes and benefits anyway. The optimization problem for the individual then is
max
t,b
U(t, b) (5)
with the budget constraint (1), being U(t, b) defined as in (3) (civic individuals) or
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as in (4) (uncivic individuals).
The constrained optimization problem (5)-(1) can be solved by introducing the La-
grangian L as:
L(t, b, λ) = U(t, b) + λ {pit[α + p(1− α)]− [(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)]b} , (6)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier.
The first order conditions are:

∂L(t,b,λ)
∂t
= ∂U(t,b)
∂t
+ λpi[α + p(1− α)] = 0;
∂L(t,b,λ)
∂b
= ∂U(t,b)
∂b
− λ[(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)] = 0;
∂L(t,b,λ)
∂λ
= pit[α + p(1− α)]− [(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)]b = 0.
(7)
In what follows we are going to separately analyze the two cases of civic and uncivic
individuals.
2.1 Civic individuals
By (3) and (6), the system of the first order conditions in (7) becomes:


− pi
y−t
+ λpi[α + p(1− α)] = 0;
1−pi
y0+b
− λ[(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)] = 0;
pit[α + p(1− α)]− [(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)]b = 0.
(8)
Solving system (8) allows obtaining the optimal tax as:
tcivic = (1− pi)−
[1− pi + pi(1− p)(1− α)]y0
α + p(1− α)
, (9)
The optimal benefit bcivic can immediately be derived by substituting t = tcivic of (9)
into the budget constraint – the third equation of system (8) –.
As in Algan et al. (2016), the support of individuals for the welfare state can intu-
itively be captured by the ratio between the preferred amount of benefits supplied by
the welfare state and the taxes needed for financing them. As such ratio increases,
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individuals want more welfare spending. Formally, we define:
ρcivic :=
y0 + bcivic
y − tcivic
=
[α + p(1− α)](1− pi)
1− pi + pi(1− p)(1− α)
, (10)
being the second equality obtained by substituting the values tcivic and bcivic in the
definition of ρcivic (first equality).
To emphasize the role of civic capital in determining individuals’ support for the
welfare state we consider the dependence of ρ on α and write ρcivic as ρcivic = ρcivic(α),
where α is the share of civic-minded individuals in the population of taxpayers.
The following result holds true:
Proposition 1. It is ρ′civic(α) ≥ 0, for each α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. A straightforward computation gives
ρ′civic(α) =
(1− pi){1− pi + pi(1− p)[1 + p(1− α)]}
[1− pi + pi(1− p)(1− α)]2
, (11)
and the sign of the right-hand side of (11) is positive.
We notice that pi 6= 1 leads to ρ′civic(α) > 0, while when pi = 1, then ρ
′
civic(α) = 0.
This means that the higher the share of civic individuals, the stronger the support for
the welfare state from civic-minded individuals. Civic individuals, in fact, will be less
concerned with the possible free riding and rent seeking activities by uncivic fellow
citizens. In addition, as the share of civic individuals in the population grows, the
probability that public officials are corrupt decreases. This prediction is consistent
with Algan et al. (2016) and, more in general, with the insights provided by the
literature on trust and welfare state, which suggests that the size of the welfare state
and citizens’ support for it are positively associated with the share of the population
that can be trusted (e.g. Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005; Rothstein and Uslaner, 2005;
Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011).
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2.2 Uncivic individuals
By plugging (4) into (7), we have:


− pip
y−t
− pi(1−p)(1−q)
y−M−t
+ λpi[α + p(1− α)] = 0;
pi(1−p)q
y+b
+ 1−pi
y0+b
− λ[(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)] = 0;
pit[α + p(1− α)]− [(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)]b = 0.
(12)
The system (12) admits solution, which will be denoted as (tuncivic, buncivic), for λ =
λuncivic. The explicit form of tuncivic and buncivic are not needed here. In fact, by the
first and second equation of (12), we can directly write the ratio between benefits and
taxes, in order to analyze the support of individuals for the welfare state. We obtain:
ρuncivic :=
y0 + buncivic
y − tuncivic
=
ρcivic
p
·
(
pi(1− p)q(y0 + buncivic)
(1− pi)(y + buncivic)
+ 1
)
−
(1− p)(1− q)(y0 + buncivic)
p(y −M − tuncivic)
.
(13)
We show that, if the fine is high enough, then support for the welfare state is
stronger in civic individuals than in uncivic ones. This claim is proved in the following:
Proposition 2. Assume that
M > M∗ := y − tuncivic −
(1− pi)(1− p)(1− q)(y0 + buncivic)(y + buncivic)
ρcivic [piq(1− p)(y0 + buncivic) + (1− pi)(y + buncivic)]
. (14)
Then ρuncivic(α) < ρcivic(α), for each α ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. The proof is a direct consequence of formula (13).
Proposition 2 deepens the result obtained by Algan et al. (2016), namely that
uncivic individuals support the welfare state more than their civic-minded fellow
citizens. In fact, if we make the plausible assumption that surveillance institutions
can inflict penalties, uncivic individuals will take into account the role of deterrent of
the penalty in their optimization problem. As a result, civic individuals will demand
more welfare than uncivic ones.
More specifically, civic individuals will be more confident that antisocial behaviours
will be not only detected but also properly punished by enforcement institutions. On
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the other hand, dishonest citizens will find extensive and universal welfare programs
less attractive, in addition to fearing the prospect of paying both a fine and the due
taxes. As expected, support for the welfare state increases with the share of civic
individuals in both types of citizen.
2.2.1 A remark on uncivic individuals when there is no punishment for tax evasion
In this case there is no punishment for tax frauds and we fall in the framework of
Algan et al. (2016), where M = 0 (and condition (14) does not hold).
The utility can be written as follows:
Uuncivic(t, b) = pi[p log(y − t) + (1− p) log(y + b)] + (1− pi) log(y0 + b). (15)
By using this utility function in the optimization problem (5) with the budget con-
straint (1), we obtain that the first order conditions in (7) are:


− pip
y−t
+ λpi[α + p(1− α)] = 0;
pi(1−p)q
y+b
+ 1−pi
y0+b
− λ[(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)] = 0;
pit[α + p(1− α)]− [(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)]b = 0.
(16)
By solving system (16) we obtain
ρ
(0)
uncivic(α) :=
y0 + b
(0)
uncivic
y − t
(0)
uncivic
=
ρcivic
p
·
(
pi(1− p)(y0 + b
(0)
uncivic)
(1− pi)(y + b
(0)
uncivic)
+ 1
)
, (17)
where the superscript (0) stands for ”case with M = 0”.
Being
1
p
·
(
pi(1− p)(y0 + b
(0)
uncivic)
(1− pi)(y + b
(0)
uncivic)
+ 1
)
> 1,
we obtain that ρ
(0)
uncivic(α) > ρcivic(α), for each α ∈ [0, 1]. As expected, this result is
in line with Algan et al. (2016).
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3 Empirical evidence
In this section, we test the predictions of the model at the individual level. Summa-
rizing, the model predicts that: i) if tax surveillance institutions can inflict penalities,
civic individuals display higher support for the welfare state than uncivic ones; ii)
when penalties are removed, the opposite of prediction i) holds true and uncivic in-
dividuals show higher support for the welfare state. To test these predictions, we use
Two-Stage Least Squares, TSLS, where the dependent variable is an indicator of indi-
viduals’ support for the welfare state, and the main explanatory variable is individual
civic capital, instrumented with the fitted probability from a nonlinear first-stage,
which provides us with consistent estimates, as explained in Wooldridge (2002). Our
data and empirical strategy are described in detail in the following subsections.
3.1 Data
The data are taken from the 2004 wave of the SHIW, which is conducted every two
years by the Bank of Italy. The sample includes about 8, 000 households and is rep-
resentative of the Italian population at the national and regional level (Bank of Italy,
2010).4 The sample was drawn in two stages (municipalities and households), with
the stratification of the primary sampling units (municipalities) by region and demo-
graphic size. Within each stratum, the municipalities in which interviews would be
conducted were selected to include all those with a population of more than 40,000
inhabitants (self-representing municipalities), while the smaller towns were selected
on the basis of probability proportional to size (Bank of Italy, 2004). The individual
households to be interviewed were then selected randomly. In the 2004 wave of the
survey, a special section on ”public spirit and taxation” was included in the question-
naire, in which respondents were asked to give their opinions on the tax system. We
measure support for the welfare state using the following question: ”Considering the
Government’s need to guarantee public services, please say which statement is closest
to your own opinion: (please give only one answer): i) The Government’s duty is
to provide all citizens with as many public services as possible (e.g. school, health-
care, pensions, etc.) even if it means heavy taxes. ii) The Government has some
4SHIW data can be downloaded from the Bank of Italy’s website at the url: http://bit.ly/shiw2004.
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unavoidable expenses for social welfare, which should be covered by taxes and duties,
increasing these as and when necessary. iii) Taxation is too high, so if there is not
enough money, expenses should be reduced by cutting back services iv) The Govern-
ment should raise the bare minimum in taxes and duties to cover absolutely essential
public services (e.g. defense, justice, the police, etc.) and leave the rest to private
initiative”. Our indicator of support for the welfare state is given by a binary variable
which takes value 1 if the respondent’s opinion is closest to statement i) or ii) and 0
otherwise. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time such a detailed indicator
is used to empirically analyze individuals’ support for the welfare state. Algan et al.
(2016), for example, measure support for the welfare state through the score given by
respondents to the following statement: ”Incomes should be made more equal” versus
“We need larger income differences as incentives” in the World Values Survey (WVS),
which specifically measures respondents’ preference for redistribution.5 To measure
civic capital, similarly to Algan et al. (2016) we follow Guiso et al. (2011) and focus
on those values that induce people to dislike actions aimed at obtaining private ben-
efits at high social costs. ”For instance, people’s opinions about cheating on taxes,
free riding on public goods, cutting in line, littering and similar behaviours can all be
good indicators of the prevalence of norms of morality and thus of people’s willingness
to internalize the public good. The common features across all these measure is that
they are value judgments on activities that result in the appropriation of (possibly
limited) private benefits at the expense of (possibly much larger) costs imposed on
other members of society” (p. 17). Guiso et al. (2011) suggest using questions like
those reported in the WVS about the perceived justifiability of free riding and rent
seeking behaviors such as avoiding a fare on public transport and cheating on taxes
whenever possible. In this paper we use responses to the question: ”Which of the
following situations do you think are always justifiable, never justifiable, or justifiable
to some extent? Please give your answer on a scale from 1 to 10, 1 being ”never
justifiable” and 10 being ”always justifiable”, and the numbers in between indicating
various degrees of agreement. i) Not paying for your ticket on public transport. ii)
5 More specifically, the WVS requires respondents to give a 10 points score to their opinion, where 10 means they
agree completely with the statement on the right. Algan et al. (2016) employ a different dependent variable, relying
on a more specific question regarding support for the welfare state, in a separate regression exploring the role of
perceived trustworthiness.
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Keeping money you obtained by accident when it would be possible to return it to
the rightful owner (for example, if you found a wallet with the owner’s name and
address, or if you were given too much change at the supermarket check-out). iii)
Not leaving your name for the owner of a car you accidentally scraped while parking.
Therefore, such a structure of the responses captures higher civicness for lower values
of the response. In order to have higher values representing higher civicness we have
inverted the answers scale by means of the following simple formula:
civicnessi = 10− xi + 1 (18)
where xi represents the i
th individual’s response and civicnessi the i
th individual’s
response in the increasing scale. Our indicator of civic capital is the mean of the
(inverted) scores given by respondents to the three statements.
The aspect of tax surveillance that matters in the taxpayers’ determination of their
optimal taxes and benefits is the perceived probability of being caught and punished
in case of tax evasion. To measure this perception we use the question: ”In your
opinion, what are the chances of someone being picked for a tax inspection?” on a
five points scale, where 1 means ”Very high” and 5 means ”Practically non-existent”.
In this case too, prob of fine the scale has been inverted in order to have increasing
values measuring higher probabilities of being caught.
In all the specifications we included controls for gender, age, household size, household
income, work status and we accounted for regional effects, education and civil status.
3.2 Empirical strategy
From an empirical point of view, answering the question whether civic individuals
have a greater or lower support for the welfare state, as compared to uncivic ones, is
a difficult task for a number of reasons. First, there are obvious endogeneity problems,
as both civicness and support for the welfare state may be driven by common latent
variables such as unobservable attitudes and abilities. On the other hand, it may be
impossible to find appropriate instruments for civicness in survey data. A further
complication is caused by the fact that both individuals’ support for the welfare state
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and their civicness are measured by categorical variables.
To address the unavailability of instruments, we followed procedure 18.1 of Wooldridge
(2002), which consists of two steps: (a) estimate an ordered response model for civic,
P (w = m|x) = P (x; γ) by maximum likelihood, where w represents the variable
capturing civicness,m is one of the possible five choices and γ is a vector of parameters
to be estimated. Obtain the fitted probabilities Pˆi; (b) use Pˆi as an instrument in
a TSLS regressing support for the welfare state, y, on w and a number of relevant
controls.
As the interpretation of the empirical analysis is basically derived from the coefficient
of the interacted term between taxpayers’ civic capital and their perception of the
probability of being caught and sanctioned for tax evasion, we instrumented both
civicness and the interaction term between civicness and the perceived probability of
being caught. This procedure has been proven to produce consistent estimates and
asymptotically valid standard errors and test statistics. Because P (x; γ) is a nonlinear
function of x, it is not perfectly correlated with x, so it can be used as an IV for w; in
addition, the model for P (x; γ) does not have to be correctly specified. Support to this
choice is provided in the literature by Cerulli (2014), among others. The categorical
nature of our variables of interest, both dependent and independent, deserves further
attention. As far as the dependent is concerned, when the regression equation has a
limited dependent variable (LDV) nonlinear models like logit or probit are invoked.
In the past, some authors had recommended accounting for the categorical nature
of the dependent variable in the specification of the models in the two stages (e.g.
Amemiya, 1978; Smith and Blundell, 1986; Newey, 1987; Rivers and Vuong, 1988).
However, the seminal work of Angrist (2001) showed that difficulties with endogenous
variables in nonlinear LDV models are usually more apparent than real, as the causal
relationship between w and y can be consistently estimated by means of a linear TSLS.
Furthermore, when an independent endogenous variable, w, measured by a discrete
indicator is also considered, Angrist’s claim still holds true. In fact, the prediction
of a nonlinear first-stage can produce inconsistent IV estimates if the model is not
correctly specified, as only the OLS estimation of the first-stage is guaranteed to
produce first-stage residuals that are uncorrelated with fitted values and covariates.
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Table 1: Dependent: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
civicness 0.0190** -0.517** -0.537** -0.640*** -0.523** -0.491**
(0.00828) (0.225) (0.225) (0.247) (0.226) (0.210)
civic * prob fine -0.00208 0.191** 0.191** 0.199** 0.193** 0.177**
(0.00289) (0.0819) (0.0812) (0.0880) (0.0826) (0.0777)
prob of fine -0.0109 -1.695** -1.700** -1.773** -1.713** -1.564**
(0.0262) (0.715) (0.708) (0.769) (0.721) (0.678)
gender -0.00818 -0.0107 -0.0109 -0.0156 -0.0108 -0.0115
(0.00998) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0121)
age 0.00118*** 0.00151*** 0.00156*** 0.00187*** 0.00153*** 0.00137***
(0.000387) (0.000514) (0.000528) (0.000535) (0.000512) (0.000480)
househ. size -0.0126*** -0.0142** -0.0142** -0.0137* -0.0139** -0.0134**
(0.00473) (0.00615) (0.00625) (0.00699) (0.00617) (0.00594)
income 1.28e-08 -1.15e-07 -4.68e-08 1.61e-07 -1.10e-07 -1.76e-07
(1.95e-07) (4.07e-07) (4.61e-07) (3.98e-07) (4.07e-07) (3.82e-07)
employed 0.0221 0.0123 0.00959 0.0121 0.0148
(0.0138) (0.0193) (0.0206) (0.0193) (0.0183)
self empl. -0.0464** -0.0569** -0.0560** -0.0571** -0.0404
(0.0211) (0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0265)
unemployed 0.0182 0.0367 0.0307 0.0362 0.0461
(0.0250) (0.0406) (0.0445) (0.0407) (0.0374)
fairness -0.00927
(0.0105)
tax evasion 0.0731**
(0.0306)
Constant 0.627*** 5.305*** 5.483*** 6.390*** 5.388*** 4.779***
(0.0838) (1.966) (1.962) (2.152) (1.971) (1.799)
Observations 8,703 8,703 8,703 8,703 8,703 8,703
Hansen-(p) 0.722 0.158 0.716 0.661
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Additional controls: regional dummies, education, civil status
It follows that a nonlinear first-stage is not necessary, or even not desirable, to the
point that some authors refer to it as the ”forbidden regression” (Angrist and Pishcke
2009, 143).
3.3 Results
Table 1 reports the results of the empirical application.
Column (1) reports the OLS estimate in which civicness is treated as exogenous.
In this case the estimate shows a positive relationship between civicness and support
for the welfare state. This result, however, is likely to be inconsistent due to the
endogeneity problems described above. To further test the endogeneity of civicness
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we performed a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, which rejects the null of exogeneity at 1%,
prompting us to turn to the TSLS estimator. As explained in Section 3.2, instruments
are Pˆi taken from the ordered probit of civicness on the other covariates. More specif-
ically, as civicness takes on ten classes we can have up to nine potential instruments
for civicness and a similar reasoning applies to its interaction with the probability
of being punished in case of cheating. In the estimate reported in column (2), our
benchmark, we have taken the first two Pˆi’s of the first-stage of civicness plus the first
Pˆi of the second first-stage, the one attaining the interaction term between civicness
and the probability of being caught in case of tax evasion. The Hansen J statistic
does not reject the null of the validity (p-value 0.722). Diagnostics of underidentifica-
tion and weak identification have also been performed for each endogenous regressor
separately, using the method described by Angrist and Pischke (2009, 217-218). In
this case we cannot accept the null of underidentification and weak identification at
1%, thus supporting the consistency of the estimated coefficients. In addition, the
first-stage estimates show significant correlation between the instruments and the in-
strumented variables at 1% and 5% for civiceness and its interaction, respectively.
Column (2) reports the equivalent specification of the OLS performed with TSLS.
Once endogeneity is accounted for, the variables of interest flip sign; civicness is now
negatively and significantly correlated with support for the welfare state, consistently
with Algan et al. (2016). This suggests that civic-minded individuals want less exten-
sive welfare programs, probably because they are concerned with the free riding and
rent seeking activities possibly carried out by fellow taxpayers. Uncivic individuals,
on the other hand, express a higher support for the welfare state, probably because
they are less concerned with the higher taxes needed to fund welfare schemes and
because they hope to extract rents from them.
The interaction term between civicness and the perceived probability of being caught
in case of tax evasion, on the other hand, is significantly positive. This suggests that
once civic and uncivic individuals confront themselves with the possibility of being
punished by surveillance institutions that can perform unexpected tax inspections, we
observe a shift in their support for the welfare state. Civic individuals are now more
confident that free riding and rent seeking activities will be monitored and properly
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punished and, as predicted by Proposition 2, they express a higher support for the
welfare state. Uncivic citizens, on the other hand, may be less confident in their ability
to cheat on taxes and to obtain inappropriate rents from public protection schemes,
and therefore express lower support for welfare spending. The perceived probabil-
ity that dishonest behaviors will be sanctioned, which is a proxy for the perceived
efficiency of surveillance institutions, has a significant and negative association with
individuals’ support for the welfare state. This result suggests that taxpayers actually
account for enforcement institutions in the determination of their optimal taxes, and
that their opinions on public spending programs are significantly affected by their
perceived ability to elude taxes. The lower is the perceived efficiency and tigthness of
surveillance institutions, the higher may be the preference for welfare spending. This
result is in line with the gist of Algan et al.’s (2016) arguments, to the extent that it
takes into account the role of dishonesty in shaping people’s support for the welfare
state. As for the controls, support for the welfare state significantly increases with
age. In addition to individuals’ approaching retirement, this result may be related
to worsening health conditions, which, unfortunately, we were unable to control for
in the dataset. Self-employed workers show lower support for the welfare state. Self-
employment has traditionally been associated with greater economic individualism
and concomitant resistance to the welfare state. Expressions of the hostility of the
self-employed to the state in general and to the welfare state in particular abound in
Italy and elsewhere (see among others the seminal work of Wilensky, 1975).
As a robustness check, we controlled for the possible role of respondents’ beliefs re-
garding fairness of opportunities and self- and exogenous-determination (column 5).
Fong (2011) showed that beliefs about self- and exogenous-determination are strong
predictors of support for redistribution in the United States. To measure beliefs about
self-determination we used responses to the following question: ”Have you ever asked
relatives or friends and acquaintances to help you or a member of your household find
work or deal with government red tape (e.g. speed up formalities)?”. We interpret the
fact of relying on personal contacts, instead of personal abilities and skills, as a sign of
the belief that achieving results in life partly depends on potentially exogenous factors
- such as the luck of being born in the right family. In addition we controlled for an
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indicator of the perceived seriousness of tax evasion (column 6) by using responses to
the question: ”Generally speaking, among the problems facing the Government, that
of tax evasion is (choose one of the following items): non existent, marginal, the same
as any other, serious, very serious”. While the sign and significance of the estimates
do not change, we interestingly observe a significant and positive correlation between
the perceived seriousness of tax evasion and support for the welfare state. This result
suggests that supporters of the welfare state are indeed concerned with the possibility
of free-riding on taxes and rent-seeking on welfare benefits by their fellow citizens,
and that tighter surveillance institutions may induce a more truthful revelation of the
preferences of civic-minded individuals. As a further robustness check, we removed
one instrument from the set, column (3), an operation that did not significantly affect
the estimate.
4 Conclusions
In this article we studied how civic capital shapes citizens’ support for the welfare
state. In the theoretical analysis, we modelled the interplay between taxpayers civic-
mindedness and surveillance institutions. Following Algan et al. (2016), we assumed
that some individuals can hide their income to free-ride on taxes and to claim welfare
benefits they are not entitled to. For example, while employees whose income tax is
deducted from the pay slip have no choice but declaring their actual income, retail
dealers can choose not to issue receipts in order to hide their actual revenues. This
decision basically depends on the concrete possibility of hiding income and on the
civic capital of individuals. We innovated the literature by explicitly modelling the
possibility that tax surveillance institutions can detect and properly punish uncivic
individuals who have the possibility of hiding their income and choose to do so.
In this case, rational taxpayers internalize the probability of being caught and the
amount of the penalties due in case of tax evasion. Our results showed that when tax
surveillance is tight, civic-minded individuals support the welfare state more than
their uncivic fellow citizens. In absence of penalties for tax evasion, on the other
hand, civic taxpayers want less welfare spending than uncivic ones. After controlling
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for endogeneity issues, the empirical analysis provided support for the predictions of
the model. Overall, our results suggest that the efficiency of enforcement institutions
might play a critical role in inducing a more truthful revelation of the preferences
of civic taxpayers. More in general, the legitimacy and the political and financial
sustainability of the welfare state could be improved through the establishment of
tighter rules on tax surveillance and through long-term policies that strengthen the
civic spirit of citizens.
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